November 5, 2007: This website is an archive of the former website, traprockpeace.org, which was created 10 years ago by Charles Jenks. It became one of the most populace sites in the US, and an important resource on the antiwar movement, student activism, 'depleted' uranium and other topics. Jenks authored virtually all of its web pages and multimedia content (photographs, audio, video, and pdf files. As the author and registered owner of that site, his purpose here is to preserve an important slice of the history of the grassroots peace movement in the US over the past decade. He is maintaining this historical archive as a service to the greater peace movement, and to the many friends of Traprock Peace Center. Blogs have been consolidated and the calendar has been archived for security reasons; all other links remain the same, and virtually all blog content remains intact. THIS SITE NO LONGER REFLECTS THE CURRENT AND ONGOING WORK OF TRAPROCK PEACE CENTER, which has reorganized its board and moved to Greenfield, Mass. To contact Traprock Peace Center, call 413-773-7427 or visit its site. Charles Jenks is posting new material to PeaceJournal.org, a multimedia blog and resource center.
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PRESENTATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (23 June 2005)
Keith Baverstock PhD; Department of Environmental Sciences,
University of Kuopio, KUOPIO, Finland
I have, during a career of some 30 years, developed expertise in
evaluating risks regarding the environmental and occupational exposure to
ionising radiation and radioactive materials in many different situations. I
have done this in the context of employment by the UK Medical Research Council
(1971 to 1991) and the European Regional Office of the World Health
Organisation (1991 to 2003), both ostensibly "independent"
organisations.
Between 2000 and 2002 I examined the evidence relating to risks
from the mildly radioactive depleted uranium. My concern was especially raised
by the specific exposure context of inhalation of the dust particles produced
when a depleted uranium munition impacts a hardened target and burns, producing
fine particles of DU oxide (DUO). This material has no natural analogue and
does not arise in the normal refining and processing of uranium for nuclear
fuel. There is, therefore, no prior experience of exposure to this material
than its use in Iraq in 1991.
According to the International Commission for Radiological
Protection (ICRP), inhaled DUO would pose a hazard to the lung from radiation
if it were insoluble and a chemical toxicity risk to the kidney (physiological
toxicity of kidney malfunction) if it were soluble.
DUO is in fact part insoluble and part sparingly soluble. Since
1998 evidence has accrued that human cells exposed in the laboratory to low
concentrations of DU exhibit changes characteristic of malignant cells and
indeed, when implanted into host animals, will lead to malignancy. In these
experiments it seems unlikely, given the low concentrations and the experimental
conditions, that this effect is mediated by radiation, but is rather a
chemically mediated genotoxicity. (See for example 1-6 The non-radioactive
element, nickel, produces similar effects and is an established carcinogen.
In 2001 this evidence led me to believe that inhaled DUO
particles, which are capable of penetrating the deep lung (where they would be
retained for long periods) posed, for a period of weeks to months, not only a
radiotoxicity risk but also a chemical genotoxicity risk and potentially a
synergy between the two. Thus any risk evaluated on the basis of the ICRP
recommendations would be likely to underestimate the true risk.
In addition, that DU is only mildly radioactive through alpha
emission, raises the possibility of a further risk route mediated by the so
called "bystander effect". (See for example; 7, 8) Here a single cell
"hit" by an alpha particle sends signals to surrounding cells causing
them to behave as if they had been irradiated. In circumstances where
bystanders predominate (low dose exposure to alpha particles for example) the
bystander effect acts to amplify the "radiation effect".
Thus, detailed examination of DUO reveals three potential risk
routes in addition to the conventional radiotoxicity caused by direct
irradiation, namely, chemical genotoxicity, synergy between radiation and
chemical toxicities and a bystander route.
Since 2002 the evidence for these three routes has not diminished,
indeed the reverse is the case. More recent studies have confirmed the earlier
studies 9, 10 and concern about the bystander effect in radiotherapy patients
continues to rise.
Furthermore, US veterans with DU embedded in their bodies as a
result of friendly fire incidents and with high concentrations of DU in their
urine, show further evidence of DU's mutagenic potential in their peripheral
blood cells 11.
In my view it is highly irresponsible to continue to ignore this
evidence. There is an overwhelming case for the application of the precautionary
principle and that, at the very minimum, would require that DUO is cleaned up
at battle sites. The problem is particularly severe in Iraq where arid climatic
conditions allow DUO particles to retain the sparingly soluble component that
primarily gives rise to the extra risk routes, over long periods and promotes
conditions in which re-suspension and inhalation are optimised.
The organ primarily at risk is the lung, but DU dissolved in the
lung will locate initially in the bone, entering via the bone marrow cavities
where it can give rise to leukaemia through its chemical genotoxic potential.
The kidney, through which all systemic DU is excreted is another potential
target tissue, again from the genotoxic potential. Thus, exposure through inhalation
to DUO has the potential to cause malignancy in a number of tissues.
A number of organisations, including the World Health Organisation
12, the International Atomic Energy Agency 13, the UK Royal Society 14, the
International Commission on Radiological Protection 15 and the European
Commission Article 31 Group 16 have, since 2001, published advice relating to
the health consequences of exposure to DU. You may wonder, as I do, how such authoritative and independent
Organisations, making ostensibly "independent" assessments of the
situation can all ignore the evidence that exists in the scientific literature.
It is worth noting that these assessments may not in fact be truly
independent. For example, staff of the UK National Radiological Protection
Board (NRPB) are acknowledged as contributing to the WHO and RS reports, the
Chairman of the ICRP was recently the Director of the NRPB. Staff members of
the NRPB collaborate with the IAEA and have been members of the Article 31
Group. It is, therefore, possible that a few individuals have influenced the
outcome of these so called independent assessments.
For me, as a scientist, it is the fact that this evidence is
IGNORED, as opposed to being ADDRESSED and if appropriate discredited, through
rational scientific debate that is worrying. Science is about a reality that
over-rides political expediency. Ignoring the evidence does not mitigate the
health consequences of exposure to DU and not looking for the consequences does
not mean they do not exist. Mark Danner 17, writing in the New York Review of
Books recently, detects a currently resurgent belief that "Power,
[political power] ... can shape truth: power in the end can determine reality,
or at least the reality that most people will accept." He further notes
that that this was stated rather directly by the "last century's most
innovative authority on power", Joseph Goebbels.
I am on record 18 as saying that "politics has poisoned the
well from which democracy must drink." By this I mean that political
expediency has all but eliminated truly independent research and along with
that went PUBLIC TRUST. Without public TRUST democracy cannot work. In the
context of risk assessment SCIENCE should provide the evidence, openly and transparently,
and unalloyed with any interest in the outcome except that it be the truth. On
the basis of this evidence POLITICS should decide the risk that is acceptable
within the social and legal context of the time.
Selected References
1. Miller, A.C., et al., Urinary and serum mutagenicity
studies with rats implanted with depleted uranium or tantalum pellets.
Mutagenesis, 1998. 13(6): p. 643-8.
2. Miller, A.C., et
al., Transformation of human osteoblast cells to the tumorigenic phenotype by
depleted uranium-uranyl chloride. Environ Health Perspect, 1998. 106(8): p.
465-71.
3. Miller, A.C., et
al., Urinary and serum mutagenicity studies with rats implanted with depleted
uranium or tantalum pellets. Mutagenesis, 1998. 13(6): p. 643-8.
4. Miller, A.C., et
al., Observation of radiation-specific damage in human cells exposed to
depleted uranium: dicentric frequency and neoplastic transformation as endpoints.
Radiat Prot Dosimetry, 2002. 99(1-4): p. 275-8.
5. Miller, A.C., et
al., Depleted uranium-catalyzed oxidative DNA damage: absence of significant
alpha particle decay. J Inorg Biochem, 2002. 91(1): p. 246-52.
6. Miller, A.C., et
al., Potential late health effects of depleted uranium and tungsten used in
armor-piercing munitions: comparison of neoplastic transformation and
genotoxicity with the known carcinogen nickel. Mil Med, 2002. 167(2 Suppl): p.
120-2.
7. Mothersill, C. and
C. Seymour, Radiation-induced bystander effects: past history and future
directions. Radiat Res, 2001. 155(6): p. 759-67.
8. Belyakov, O.V., et
al., Direct evidence for a bystander effect of ionizing radiation in primary
human fibroblasts. Br J Cancer, 2001. 84(5): p. 674-9.
9.
Miller, A.C.,
et al., Effect of the militarily-relevant heavy metals, depleted uranium and
heavy metal tungsten-alloy on gene expression in human liver carcinoma cells
(HepG2). Mol Cell Biochem, 2004. 255(1-2): p. 247-56.
10. Miller, A.C., et al., Genomic
instability in human osteoblast cells after exposure to depleted uranium:
delayed lethality and micronuclei formation. J Environ Radioact, 2003. 64(2-3):
p. 247-59.
11. McDiarmid, M.A., et al.,
Health effects of depleted uranium on exposed Gulf War veterans: a 10-year
follow-up. J Toxicol Environ Health A, 2004. 67(4): p. 277-96.
12. WHO, Depleted Unanium:
Sources, Exposure and Health Effects. 2001, World Health Organisation: Geneva.
13. Bleise, A., P.R. Danesi, and
W. Burkart, Properties, use and health effects of depleted uranium (DU): a
general overview. J Environ Radioact, 2003. 64(2-3): p. 93-112.
14. RS, The health hazards of
depleted uranium munitions Part II, in Policy Document. 2002, The Royal
Society: London.
15. Valentin, J. and F.A. Fry,
What ICRP advice applies to DU? International Commission on Radiological
Protection. J Environ Radioact, 2003. 64(2-3): p. 89-92.
16. EC, Depleted Uranium, in
Opinion of the Group of Experts Established According to Article 31 of the
Euratom Treaty. 2001, European Commission: Luxembourg.
17. Danner, M., The secret way to
war, in The New York Review of Books. 2005. p. 70 - 74.
18. Baverstock, K., Science,
politics and ethics in the low dose debate. Medicine, Conflict and Survival,
2005. 21: p. 88 - 100.
© 2005 Keith Baverstock; All rights reserved.