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International Lobby for Reform in Uganda (ILORU)
18B Messaline Avenue, Acton, London W3 6JX
Tel/Fax: 0208 752 1837 / 07985333634
E-mail: information@iloru.fsnet.co.uk
Parliamentary Briefing
June 2003 Uganda: A country sleep-walking into a major crisis What is the way forward? With the 2006 Presidential election in mind, I set immediately below some compelling reasons to illustrate that, after monopolising political power in Uganda for the last 17 years, President Museveni of Uganda appears to have irreversibly lost the capacity and the will to set the foundation for real democracy, lasting peace and sustainable development in the country. I also set further below some concrete suggestions for what must be done to arrest the situation if Uganda and its people are to be saved from a looming political crisis. Such a crisis would further destabilise the whole of the Great Lakes countries, many of which are already locked in a vicious inter-tribal wars that has claimed an estimated 4.7 million lives in Eastern Congo in the last four years alone; thanks to Uganda’s role in training and arming the various factions. Consider the immediate and long term implications for Uganda of the following prevailing situations:1. The failure by the President to state categorically that he will not amend the Constitution in order to seek for a third term in office;
2. The failure by the President to unconditionally lift the 17-year ban on political activities;
3. The failure by the President to engage with national political parties;
4. The failure by the President to end the 17-year long war in the northern Uganda;
5. The fusing of the Movement political system with state institutions including the Army, Police and Prison forces, the Civil Service, the intelligence services;
6. The personalisation and politicisation of state institutions, which have been turned into sectarian instruments of oppression, and as agents of institutional theft at home and abroad;
7. The militarisation of Uganda politics as a policy, which is used to justify for the ever-spiralling increases in defence spending;
8. The downgrading by the President of poverty reduction efforts and democratisation as the national priorities, and their replacement with the survival of the Movement political system as the main concern of the Movement government. This was adequately demonstrated by November 2002 diversion of 23% of the budgets from all departments including health and education to defence;
9. The failure by the President to seriously tackle pervasive indiscipline in the running of public affairs as has been shown by his failure to act on the UN as well as several judicial Commissions on rampant and institutional corruption by Ministers, Military Officers and individuals close to the President;
10. The creation of at least twelve different para-military organisations, which carry out the day-to-day community policing; thus turning of Uganda into a police state: the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JAFT); the Special Revenue Police Service (SRPS); the General Court-Martial (TGCM), a special military court where civilian opponents of the regime are tried; the Kalangala Action Plan (KAP), an armed political mobilisation organ for the Movement system; Operation Wembley (OP); the Local Defence Unit (LDU); the Peoples’ Intelligence Network (PIN); the Presidential Protection Brigade (PPB) commanded by the president’s son Major Muhoozi Kainerugaba; the 100, 000-man Reserve Army commanded by the president’s brother, Lt. Gen. Saleh; the Internal Security Organisation (ISO); the External Security Organisation (ESO); the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), and the upgrading of police force to a military status through training, armament, leadership and the command of Major General Katumba Wamala, a three-star Military General;
11. The widespread human rights abuse with thousands of people facing politically motivated treasons charges;
12. The introduction of draconian press laws, which allow for the arrest and criminal prosecution of journalists who write stories about rebel activities, which seem to be spreading in the North, East and West of the country;
13. The creation of several “Safe Houses” or ungazetted detention centres where the para-military organisations routinely hold, torture and murder suspected political opponents of the regime;
14. The failure by the President to take seriously and respond to the Parliamentary Select Committee report on Electoral Violence; which found that electoral violence has increased by 512%, and that Ugandans have lost faith that their votes would bring about a change of government;
15. The herding of millions of Ugandans into Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps where they live in sub-human conditions in the North, East and West of the country;
16. The creation of instability in the region by invading and occupying the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), training and arming several militia factions;
17. The setting of Uganda on a war-footing with Rwanda, a previously friendly country. Claiming that Rwanda was poised to attack Uganda, the President told Claire Short in a leaked August 2001 letter: “adequate military and security spending is actually a most primary economic investment”, and asked her “to show understanding to our intention to raise our defence spending beyond the 1.9% of GDP we had agreed with the donors”.
What must be done?
The situations indicated above represent the progressive personalisation and weakening by the Movement political system of Uganda’s state organs, a situation which has left Uganda perilously facing a real and increasing prospect of becoming a failed state like Somalia or Liberia. With the memories of wide-spread state-inspired violence during the 2001 election still fresh in people’s minds, the next election scheduled for 2006 will be a make-or-break point for Uganda.
As a major aid donor to Uganda, and considering that the election is less than three years away, the UK government should urgently work with its partners in the European Union and encourage the Ugandan government to call for a National Convention without delay. Facilitated by the EU, the Convention will bring together all political parties, civil society and pressure groups, who will discuss and agree on a roadmap leading to a free and fair electoral process in 2006. The aim of the Convention will be to create the conditions that are necessary for a peaceful change of the system governance from the present undemocratic and militaristic Movement to a multiparty and a truly democratic system. At the minimum, this will involve following specific time-framed activities:
Oct. 2003 The repeal of the Movement Act, which fuses the ruling (Movement) political system with state organs;
Oct. 2003 The commencement of negotiation leading to a ceasefire between government and all fighting forces, and conclusion of peace agreements which will have an inbuilt mechanisms for prevention and monitoring of human rights abuses and sanctions against violations;
Nov. 2003 The full and unconditional removal all restrictions on opposition political activities;
Nov. 2003 The unconditional and safe return of all exiled opposition politicians;
Nov. 2003 Defining and agreeing on a plan for the rehabilitation and resettlement of former combatants, abductees, internally displaced persons and refugees;
Dec 2003 The establishment of a Multi-partisan Military Commission to oversee the re-organization and professionalisation of the army and other security organs;
Dec 2003 The abolition of all intelligence and security organisations;
Dec 2003 The abolition of the Special Military Tribunal, which currently tries civilian opponents of the regime;
Dec 2003 The reinstitution of poverty reduction and democratisations efforts as national priorities and the reversal the Oct 2002 diversion of 23% of all departmental budgets to defence;
Jan 2004 Disbanding of the Constitutional Review Commission;
Jan 2004 Reconstitute and guarantee the independence of the Electoral Commission in order to make it competent and credible
Feb 2004 The introduction of a law barring military and security personnel from taking part in any aspect of the electoral process;
Feb 2004 the endings to the gross human rights abuse in which unknown thousands of political opponents are currently on treason remand;
Feb 2003 The repeal of the law that requires that treason suspects (mostly political opponents) are held in remand for at least 366 days before they can be considered for bail;
June 2004 The establishment of a caretaker government of national unity, for for the period leading up to the election, with a strict Code of Conduct to oversee the peace", process, prepare free and fair elections under a multi-party system and V to restore of friendly relations with all neighbouring countries.
Jan. 2005 The deployment of an independent EU and African Union Election Observers;
Jan 2005 The launching of civic education in the electoral process; and
Mar. 2006 Presidential election.
To miss the implementation of any of these requirements is to bring Uganda a step nearer towards a crisis, come the Presidential election in 2006.
Sam A Akaki
European Co-ordinator
Page created July 3, 2003 by Charlie Jenks
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